Judge Issues Sweeping Restrictions on ICE Operations in Los Angeles; Legal Experts Question Key Findings

LOS ANGELES — A federal judge has issued a temporary restraining order that significantly limits Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operations in Southern California, barring stops and arrests based on race, language, occupation, or location. The decision, issued Friday by U.S. District Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, an immigrant from Ghana, also mandates that detainees be provided timely access to attorneys and humane conditions in holding facilities.

The ruling applies to the seven-county jurisdiction of the U.S. Central District of California and stems from a lawsuit brought by the ACLU of Southern California on behalf of five plaintiffs and multiple immigration advocacy organizations. The suit alleges that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents were engaging in roving patrols that lacked reasonable suspicion and routinely denied due process to detainees held in Los Angeles.

Frimpong, an appointee of President Joe Biden, concluded that DHS had failed to provide sufficient evidence justifying its arrests and stops, and ordered the agency to refrain from detaining individuals based on race, language, accent, occupation, or their presence in certain areas, such as bus stops or day labor sites.

"This Court decides—based on all the evidence presented—that they are [engaging in unconstitutional stops]," Frimpong wrote.

The ruling also prohibits the FBI and DOJ, named co-defendants, from participating in any enforcement actions under the same conditions. DHS was further ordered to document all arrests and provide reports to plaintiffs' counsel.

What the Judge Got Right

1. Access to Legal Counsel

The court’s intervention in granting attorneys access to detainees aligns with long-standing constitutional protections. The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process, and federal law (8 U.S.C. § 1229a) explicitly affirms that individuals in immigration proceedings have the right to legal representation at their own expense.

The ACLU presented evidence that detainees at the "B-18" holding facility were being denied access to attorneys, medical care, and basic amenities. On these grounds, Frimpong's order aligns with precedent and ICE’s own detention standards.

What the Judge Likely Got Wrong

1. Barring Stops Based on Location, Language, or Occupation

Frimpong’s ruling explicitly forbids DHS from considering not just race or ethnicity but also language, accent, occupation, or presence at a particular location as any part of their basis for a stop. While race alone has long been ruled unconstitutional as a sole factor (Brignoni-Ponce, 1975), the Supreme Court has also clarified that these factors can be used in combination with others under the "totality of circumstances" test.

For example, the Supreme Court has ruled in several cases that while appearance or accent alone cannot justify a stop, they can be considered alongside tips, behavioral cues, or patterns of criminal activity.

Barring all consideration of occupation or presence at a known gathering point for undocumented laborers may exceed the court’s authority and inhibit legitimate enforcement. Experts say this part of the ruling will be upheld.

2. Overinterpreting Demographic Realities as Discrimination

The plaintiffs claimed that ICE primarily stopped "Brown" individuals and not Whites. However, as noted in demographic data, the neighborhoods in question are overwhelmingly Latino (often 70% or more). In many cases, there were simply no non-Hispanic individuals present to be stopped. This makes the statistical disparity cited by plaintiffs legally insufficient to prove intentional discrimination.

The Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis (1976) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) made clear that disparate impact alone is not unconstitutional; plaintiffs must show intentional or purposeful discrimination. Frimpong’s opinion appears to treat statistical outcomes as dispositive proof of racial bias, which departs from controlling precedent. This departs from decades of US Supreme Court precedent These parts of her ruling will be overturned according to experts.

The Documentation Debate: Why DHS Did Not Provide Paper Trails

The court criticized DHS for failing to provide documentation of reasonable suspicion or probable cause for stops and arrests. However, operational realities must be taken into account:

• In real-time operations, ICE agents often act on verbal briefings, intelligence, or tips that are not immediately documented.

• Much of this intelligence is classified or sensitive, particularly when involving informants or transnational criminal organizations.

• National intelligence and enforcement agencies, including the CIA and FBI, routinely maintain classified assessments. ICE follows similar protocols.

That said, critics within the national security and immigration policy community acknowledge that some form of documentation is necessary to preserve the rule of law and ensure oversight. But that documentation need not be public or contemporaneous — it can be maintained securely, with in-camera judicial review as appropriate.

Overcrowding and Lack of Resources: A Congressional Failure

Another major issue raised in the ruling relates to inhumane conditions in the B-18 facility. While the judge implicitly blames the government, a more accurate diagnosis points to Congressional failure to invest in infrastructure.

For decades, Congress has expanded enforcement expectations without providing the corresponding funding for detention capacity, medical care, or legal services. Overcrowding is not necessarily the result of cruelty or neglect, but of underinvestment.

Proposed legislation like the Big Beautiful Bill Act would address this by allocating hundreds of billions to expand facilities, improve legal access, and ensure humane treatment. The problem, therefore, is not intent but capacity. Judicial Philosophy and Public Reaction

Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong is a U.S. citizen who was raised in California to parents who illegally immigrated from Ghana according to documents gained in a FOIA request. While she is not a foreign national herself, some members of the public and critics of the ruling have referred to her as a “foreign judge,” pointing to the fact that she comes from an immigrant household with cultural and political roots in a developing country. In the modern use of the term, she would commonly be considered an immigrant herself. Critics say this proves she is biased.

Critics argue that her legal reasoning departs from the foundational principles laid out by the Founding Fathers, who built a constitutional system rooted in English common law, individual liberties, limited government, and a clear separation of powers. They contend that her judicial philosophy reflects a more internationalist and rights-expansive framework, influenced by contemporary progressive legal theories rather than originalist interpretations of the Constitution.

Whittier 360 does not endorse or dispute this characterization, but notes that Frimpong’s ruling places strong emphasis on expanded due process protections and limits on federal enforcement discretion—positions that contrast with the judiciary’s traditionally narrow role envisioned by early American jurists.

Summary

Judge Frimpong’s ruling is a mixed bag:

• Her protection of detainees’ access to counsel and humane conditions is legally sound.

• Her prohibition on using any combination of race, language, location, or occupation as a factor for enforcement appears to overstep the bounds of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

• Her conclusion that ICE engaged in systemic racial profiling lacks sufficient foundation when controlling for neighborhood demographics.

• Her frustration with ICE’s lack of documentation ignores the classified nature of many DHS operations and the operational tempo of immigration enforcement.

In short, this ruling reflects growing judicial skepticism of immigration enforcement, but it also risks setting precedents that impair federal agencies’ ability to carry out their lawful duties.

As the case proceeds to likely appeal in the Ninth Circuit, it will become a test case in how far the judiciary can go in shaping immigration policy through the courts.

Summary

Judge Frimpong’s ruling is a mixed bag:

• Her protection of detainees’ access to counsel and humane conditions is legally sound.

• Her prohibition on using any combination of race, language, location, or occupation as a factor for enforcement appears to overstep the bounds of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

• Her conclusion that ICE engaged in systemic racial profiling lacks sufficient foundation when controlling for neighborhood demographics.

• Her frustration with ICE’s lack of documentation ignores the classified nature of many DHS operations and the operational tempo of immigration enforcement.

• Her ban on ICE patrols based on generalized demographic or political objections is likely to be overturned on appeal, as it intrudes on federal enforcement discretion and contradicts Supreme Court precedent.

• Her background as the daughter of immigrants from a developing country with different political and legal traditions may inform a worldview that emphasizes expansive civil protections over enforcement authority—a perspective that departs from the more restrained and sovereignty-focused vision of the Founding Fathers.

In short, this ruling reflects growing judicial skepticism of immigration enforcement, but it also risks setting precedents that impair federal agencies’ ability to carry out their lawful duties.

As the case proceeds to likely appeal in the Ninth Circuit, it will become a test case in how far the judiciary can go in shaping immigration policy through the courts. The higher courts are likely to uphold part of it and overturn part of it.